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This paper assesses the long-run and short-run (i.e. along the transition path) wel-
fare implications of permanent changes in in￿ ation in an environment with essential
money and perfectly competitive markets. The model delivers a monetary distribution
that matches moments of the distribution seen in the US data. Although there is po-
tential for wealth redistribution to deliver welfare gains from in￿ ation, the (total) costs
of 10 percent in￿ ation relative to zero is over 7 percent of consumption. While these
results suggest a dominating real-balance e⁄ect of in￿ ation, a politico-economic analy-
sis concludes that the prevailing (majority rule) in￿ ation rate is above the Friedman
Rule.
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1. Introduction
While it is well known that many central banks around the world maintain long-run
in￿ ation targets above zero, the welfare implications of following such policies are not fully
understood. The goal of this paper is to quantitatively assess the welfare costs of in￿ ation
in an environment which delivers: (i) a micro-founded rationale for holding money balances;
and (ii) a nondegenerate distribution of money holdings across agents that shares properties
with the available monetary data in the US.
Since Lucas (2000), quantifying the welfare implications of alternative monetary policies
has been a prominent issue in monetary economics.1 Subsequent papers such as Lagos and
Wright (2005) stress the importance of assessing these welfare e⁄ects (among other issues)
in an environment with su¢ cient microfoundations making money essential. One common
formalization of these microfoundations is through search-theoretic monetary environments
with bilateral matching and bargaining. While Lagos and Wright (2005) and others studied
the welfare e⁄ects in environments with simplifying assumptions that deliver a degenerate
monetary distribution across agents, Molico (2006) and Chiu and Molico (2011) have relaxed
these assumptions and assessed the distributional welfare e⁄ects of in￿ ation.2 In a related
study, Dressler (2011) avoids the computational burden associated with bilateral bargaining
by assuming that agents meet multilaterally in a centralized Walrasian market and take a
1The literature which theoretically maps out the welfare implications of in￿ ation stems as far back as
Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969).
2Having money be essential in an environment generally results in the set of allocations supported with
money being larger (and possibly better) than without. Other examples that allow for a nondegenerate
monetary distribution in a search-theoretic environment are Green and Zhou (1998, 2002), Camera and
Corbae (1999), Zhou (1999), and Zhu (2003, 2005).
2competitively determined price as given.3 While Molico (2006), Chiu and Molico (2011) and
Dressler (2011) have shown that interesting policy analyses can be performed in models with
essential money delivering a nondegenerate distribution of money holdings across agents,
none of these models deliver monetary distributions that match relevant properties of US
data.
Assessing the welfare implications of in￿ ation in a model that delivers an empirically
plausible monetary distribution is important because there are two o⁄-setting e⁄ects of
in￿ ation. First, the well known real-balance e⁄ect implies that in￿ ation is always costly in
terms of welfare by serving as a distortionary tax on money holdings. However, there is also
a potentially welfare improving, redistributive e⁄ect that arises from the transfer of liquidity
from those with excess liquidity to those that are liquidity constrained. In other words,
an increase in in￿ ation serves as a tax (subsidy) to households with above (below) average
money holdings. The potential relevance of this second e⁄ect can be supported by the
empirical distribution of money holdings across US households taken from the 2004 Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF). Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of checking accounts across
households from the SCF normalized such that average holdings are equal to one. It is clear
from the ￿gure that a large majority of households are holding below average balances, and
the resulting median-mean ratio is 0:44:4 Therefore, given that the majority of agents can
bene￿t from the redistributive e⁄ect of expansionary monetary policies, previous analyses
that do not take the empirical distribution into account are potentially ignoring a large
portion of the full welfare implications of in￿ ation.5
The model studied in this paper extends Dressler (2011) in order to deliver a monetary
distribution more in line with the data. Similar to Dressler (2011), agents are allowed to
3This analysis could be viewed as a quantitative extension of Bewley (1980) and Lucas (1980).
4The SCF also contains data on all transactions accounts (money market, checking, saving and call
accounts). The characteristics of this distribution, the Gini coe¢ cient and median-mean ratio in particular,
are surprising similar to the distribution described here.
5Welfare bene￿ts of positive in￿ ation due to substantial wealth redistribution for large and moderate
in￿ ations have been documented by Doepke and Schneider (2006a and 2006b).
3trade multilaterally in a Walrasian market at a competitively determined price.6 However,
while Dressler (2011) assumes agents face idiosyncratic consumption and production shocks
concurrently in order to mimic a search-theoretic environment, the model presented here
assumes all agents consume and produce a nonstorable good in every period while some
receive a noninsurable preference shock. The shared ability of all agents to produce in every
period reduces the liquidity demand for money, but money is still essential and held for self-
insurance in the event that an agent receives a shock and would rather purchase consumption
than produce it. The two degrees of freedom in the model are the size of this shock and the
portion of the population receiving it. These degrees of freedom are used to calibrate the
model in order to match a measure of monetary demand used previously in other analyses
(i.e. velocity), as well as the median-mean ratio found in the SCF data.
The long-run, average welfare implications of alternative monetary policies are calculated
as in previous analyses by comparing the stationary (steady state) monetary distributions
from the model under several in￿ ation rates with the zero in￿ ation steady state. Although
the distributions display a potential for signi￿cant welfare gains from expansionary monetary
policy, the welfare costs of in￿ ation are much larger than what has been previously reported.
In particular, the costs of 10 percent in￿ ation relative to zero percent is calculated to be
5.10 percent of consumption. This cost is larger than the maximum welfare cost calculated
by Lagos and Wright (2005) for various degrees of bargaining power, and much larger than
the calculations of Lucas (2000) using a representative-agent model (one percent of income)
and of Chiu and Molico (2011) using a variant of the Lagos-Wright model (0.59 percent of
consumption).7 It is shown through a decomposition of the welfare costs that although the
redistributive e⁄ect is in operation and does deliver bene￿ts, the costs delivered by the real-
balance e⁄ect are upwards of 10 times larger. One reason why the real-balance e⁄ect is so
6Rocheteau and Wright (2005) consider competitive pricing in a version of the Lagos-Wright model, but
maintain the assumptions delivering a degenerate monetary distribution.
7Lagos and Wright (2005) calculate the welfare gain of going from 10 percent in￿ ation to 0 to be between
3 and 5 percent of consumption, depending on the bargaining power of the buyers and sellers within a pairwise
match. The welfare costs of Chiu and Molico (2011) should be viewed as a lower bound since they assume
that buyers receive all the surplus from bargaining.
4large is that in￿ ation hurts buyers signi￿cantly more than sellers, and the model calibration
results in a buyer-seller ratio of over 2. Therefore, even though the model captures a key
moment of the empirical monetary distribution, the redistributive e⁄ect of expansionary
monetary policies appear small from an aggregate welfare perspective.
The long-run welfare analysis is extended by assessing the short-run (transitional) welfare
implications. In particular, short-run dynamics of the economy are calculated as the economy
transitions from a zero-in￿ ation steady state to a nonzero (permanent) in￿ ation steady state.
The average welfare costs are calculated by comparing the transition to the new steady state
against the alternative of remaining at zero in￿ ation. The results from this exercise essentially
mimic the long-run analysis, insofar that transitions to positive (negative) in￿ ation result in
average welfare losses (gains). However, these costs can again be large. For example, the
welfare costs of transitioning to 10 percent in￿ ation relative to staying at zero percent is 2.25
percent of consumption, and this transition takes only ￿ve (annual) periods. This implies
that the total welfare costs of 10 percent in￿ ation, taking the short and long run together,
can be as large as 7.35 percent of consumption.
Despite the relatively small redistributive e⁄ect on average welfare in both the long and
short runs, there still could be signi￿cant welfare implications at the individual level. A ￿nal
exercise adds a politico-economic component to the model and determines which in￿ ation
rate would prevail if the agents were allowed to vote. The value of this exercise lies in the
fact that although the welfare maximizing in￿ ation rate in this environment from a planner￿ s
perspective is the Friedman Rule (one minus the inverse of the discount rate), this in￿ ation
rate may not be in the best interest of a majority of the agents due to the redistributive e⁄ect.
The steady-state politico-economic recursive competitive equilibrium is calculated using the
method of Corbae et al. (2009), and the prevailing in￿ ation rate turns out to be ￿3:0 percent
while the calibrated Friedman Rule is ￿4:16 percent. The voting outcome being de￿ ation
is yet another result of the dominant real-balance e⁄ect in the model. However, the fact
that the voting outcome is greater than the Friedman Rule suggests that the overall welfare
5maximizing in￿ ation rate is not optimal for a majority of the households. This prevailing
in￿ ation rate above the Friedman Rule is a signi￿cant result of the redistributive e⁄ect.
In addition to the monetary literature cited above, this analysis is related to the lit-
erature considering politico-economic environments and the inequality e⁄ects of in￿ ation.
Bhattacharya et al. (2001 and 2005) ￿nd a non-monotonic relationship between in￿ ation
and inequality in an over-lapping generations framework. Bullard and Waller (2004) ￿nd in-
￿ ationary biases when a central bank applies a majority voting rule. Albanesi (2007) studies
the distribution impact of in￿ ation in a model where rich and poor agents Nash-bargain over
the in￿ ation rate as opposed to voting. Other studies which consider the inequality e⁄ects
of in￿ ation without voting are Imrohoroglu (1992) and Erosa and Ventura (2002). These
endowment economies use cash-in-advance constraints and assess money￿ s role as a store of
value and a medium of exchange, respectively. Finally, Hulagu (2011) extends Imrohoroglu
(1992) to include idiosyncratic labor productivity and applies the same voting solution used
here. His model predicts a steady-state voting outcome of 1:1 percent, which exceeds the
￿3:0 percent predicted in this analysis. Several potential reasons for this higher outcome
are that money is not essential in his model, he assumes labor preferences that ignore wealth
e⁄ects, and his model is calibrated to non-monetary features of the data. Nonetheless, these
analyses together show that an in￿ ation rate above the Friedman Rule prevails in a variety
of politico-economic settings.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model and de￿nes
equilibrium. Section 3 describes the parameterization of the environment and presents the
quantitative results. Section 4 concludes.






















Figure 1: Distribution of (normalized) checking accounts, 2004 SCF data.
72. Model
2.1. Environment










where xt and yt denote consumption and production of a perfectly divisible and nonstorable
good in period t, ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor, and et 2 E is an uninsurable, idiosyncratic
preference shock which evolves according to a ￿nite state Markov process ￿(et+1jet). Let the
set be E = fb;sg where b(s) denotes a relatively high (low) preference shock. The period












where ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and ￿ is the intertemporal (Frisch) elasticity
of labor supply.8
There exists a stock of ￿at money that is perfectly divisible, costlessly storable, and
unable to be produced or consumed by any private individual. Let ^ Mt denote the stock of
money available at the beginning of period t: The law of motion for the money stock is given
by ^ Mt+1 = (1 + ￿t) ^ Mt where ￿t is the growth rate of the money stock in period t: Agents
can hold any nonnegative amount of money (^ mt 2 R+); and new money is injected into the
environment via identical lump-sum transfers ￿t to all agents at the beginning of the period.
After receiving their shocks and transfers, all agents are granted access to a centralized
market where they are permitted to buy and/or sell consumption goods at a competitively
determined price ^ Pt > 0. Although there is a single consumption good that can be produced
by all agents with equal e¢ ciency, type b(s) agents may wish to consume (produce) more
8Production is assumed to be one-for-one with inputted labor, so the disutility of production yt appears
in place of labor supply.
8than they wish to produce (consume). In addition, all agents are assumed to be anonymous,
which precludes the availability of credit and generates an essential role for money as a
medium of exchange.9
It should be noted that having buyers produce and sellers consume in the model are
motivated by the need to have an amount of consumption be nonmonetary. In other words,
the consumption of a seller and the production of a buyer can be interpreted as either
consumption of their own production or simple one-for-one trades with other agents.10 Since
these exchanges do not involve money, it delivers enough ￿ exibility for the model to be
calibrated to match monetary velocity while delivering a distribution with a mass of agents
holding near zero money balances.11
2.2. Recursive competitive equilibrium
The environment is rendered stationary by normalizing all nominal variables by the
beginning of period stock of money (e.g. mt = ^ mt= ^ Mt and Mt = ^ Mt= ^ Mt = 1). Let the joint
distribution of money holdings and preference shocks across agents be denoted ￿t (mt;et)
with law of motion ￿t+1 = H (￿t;￿t): The aggregate money stock is given by
Mt =
Z
mtd￿t (mt;et) = 1 (3)
and aggregate consumption and production are given by
Xt =
Z
xtd￿t (mt;et) and Yt =
Z
ytd￿t (mt;et):
9These conditions are maintained by Levine (1991), Kotcherlakota (1998), and Rocheteau and Wright
(2005).
10One can argue that the same types of exchanges take place in the centralized markets of search-theoretic
monetary models (i.e. Lagos and Wright, 2005).
11If all consumption was purchased with currency, then the inverse relationship between prices and output
(given a ￿xed quantitiy of money) makes matching velocity very di¢ cult (see Molico, 2006). If buyers could
not produce for themselves, then all agents would hold larger money balances for self-insurance and the
resulting distribution would not resemble the data.
9Letting x and x0 denote xt and xt+1; respectively, the household problem can be stated
recursively as
V (m;e;￿;￿) = max
















0 = H (￿;￿)
￿
0 = ￿(￿;￿)
where the perceived law of motion for the money growth rate is given by ￿t+1 = ￿(￿t;￿t):
The solution to the household￿ s problem generates decision rules which are denoted by
x = ￿ (m;e;￿;￿); y = g (m;e;￿;￿); and m
0 = h(m;e;￿;￿):
De￿nition: Given ￿(￿;￿); a recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE) is a set of functions
fV; ￿; g; h; H; Pg such that:
1. Given (￿;￿;H;￿); the functions V (￿); ￿ (￿); g (￿); and h(￿) solve the household￿ s
problem in (4).






3. Prices are competitively determined such that the markets for goods (condition 2) and
money holdings (3) clear.
104. The law of motion for money is satis￿ed.








2.3. Politico-economic recursive competitive equilibrium
Given the de￿nition of a RCE, the money growth rate can be made endogenous via vot-
ing. In particular, households are allowed to vote on ￿0: Given that households are rational,
voters evaluate the equilibrium e⁄ects of their choices, calculate the expected discounted
utility associated with each ￿0; and choose the ￿0 which gives them highest utility.12 Since
the source of household heterogeneity arises from idiosyncratic shocks to preferences, the me-
dian voter is not as readily identi￿ed as in models which assume nonstochastic shocks (e.g.
Krusell and R￿os-Rull, 1999). Therefore, the analysis follows Corbae et al. (2009) and de-
termines the median of the distribution of ￿ most preferred￿in￿ ation rates among households
as the winning outcome.13
In order to choose the most preferred in￿ ation rate, a household must choose among
alternatives. Suppose a household with state vector (m;e;￿;￿) were to consider a one-
period deviation for next period￿ s money growth rate ￿0 not necessarily given by ￿(￿;￿)
while taking as given that all future money growth choices will be given by ￿: The household￿ s
problem would then be given by
~ V (m;e;￿;￿;￿
0) = max





12It should be noted that the terms money growth rate and in￿ ation rate can be used interchangeably
when the economy is in a steady state.
13In other words, the selected in￿ ation rate is the Condorcet winner which beats any alternative in￿ ation









0 = ~ H (￿;￿;￿
0)
where ~ H denotes the law of motion for ￿ induced by the deviation, while all future distrib-
utions evolve according to H: Note that the future value function is given by the solution to
(4). A solution to this problem generates
x = ~ ￿ (m;e;￿;￿); y = ~ g (m;e;￿;￿); and m
0 = ~ h(m;e;￿;￿):
De￿nition: A politico-economic recursive competitive equilibrium (PRCE) is:
1. a set of functions fV; ￿; g; h; H; Pg that satisfy the de￿nition of a RCE;
2. a set of functions
n
~ V ;~ ￿; ~ g;~ h
o
that solve (5), at a price which clears the market and







with continuation values satisfying condition 1 above;
3. in individual state (m;e)i ; household i￿ s most preferred growth rate ￿i satis￿es
￿
i = ￿((m;e)i ;￿;￿) = argmax
￿0
~ V ((m;e)i ;￿;￿;￿
0) (6)








Condition 4 above e⁄ectively de￿nes the median voter. The median money growth rate is
determined by sorting agents by their most preferred money growth rate and then integrating
the distribution of most preferred money growth rates over (m;e) using ￿(m;e):
3. Quantitative Analysis
This section establishes the calibration of the environment and presents the quantitative
results. The results from the long-run analysis of the model are presented ￿rst, followed by
the results from the short-run and poltico-economic analyses.
3.1. Parameterization
Some of the model parameters (￿; ￿; and ￿) are standard. A model period corresponds
to one year, implying ￿ = 0:96: The preference parameters are set to ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1=2:
Studies by McCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986) estimate the Frisch elasticity to be between
0 and 0.54. A robustness analysis is performed on these two preference parameters at the
end of this section.
It is assumed that shocks are transient across households (i.e. ￿(bje) = ￿(b) and
￿(sje) = ￿(s) = 1 ￿ ￿(b)), and the value of the seller￿ s preference shock is normalized
to one. This leaves two parameters to be calibrated: the unconditional probability of re-
ceiving a buyer shock (￿(b)) and the size of the preference shock for a buyer (e = b): These
two parameters are calibrated so the steady state of the model under ￿ = 0:02 displays a
monetary velocity of 5 and a stationary monetary distribution with a median equal to 0.44.
13The choice of the monetary velocity follows Molico (2006) and others, while the median of
the monetary distribution is taken from the empirical distribution calculated from the 2004
Survey of Consumer Finances. The resulting parameter values are ￿(b) = 0:69 and b = 4:76:
3.2. Findings
This section presents the quantitative results for a long-run, short-run and politico
economic analysis of the environment. The long-run analysis compares properties of the
invariant monetary distributions for the environment under several constant money growth
rates as in the analyses of Molico (2006), Chiu and Molico (2010) and Dressler (2011).14
The short-run analysis calculates the transition paths from a steady state with ￿ = 0:00
to the same steady states considered in the long-run analysis and compares the welfare
implications along the path and remaining at zero in￿ ation.15 The politico-economic analy-
sis compares voting outcomes under the assumptions that the median voter chooses a fu-
ture permanent money growth rate, and that the monetary authority has full commitment.
This delivers a simplifying restriction on the sequential PRCE de￿ned above such that





= ￿t+n; for all ￿t+n and ￿t+n; n = 1;2;:::; with ￿t+n = ￿0 (￿;￿) =
argmax￿0 ~ V ((m;e)m ;￿;￿;￿0): It should be noted that this restriction is only on the evolu-
tion of money growth rates. The evolution of ￿ is given by H (￿;￿) and the entire transition
of the price level must be computed for each possible money growth rate. However, similar
to the short-run analysis, the evolution of ￿ can be computed by determining the transition
from a steady state with an initial money growth rate ￿0 to a new steady state with the
proposed money growth rate ￿T where ￿t = ￿T for all t ￿ 1:16
14The stationary distributions of the environment can be calculated using standard solution methods. For
example, Hugget (1993) and Aiyagari (1994).
15The transitions between two stationary steady states again follows standard solution methods. For
example, R￿os-Rull (1999).
16While the assumption of commitment is a simpli￿cation of the sequential voting problem, it is a natural
extention of the (long run) steady-state comparisons performed in much of the monetary literature.
143.2.1. Long-run analysis
The steady state results under zero percent in￿ ation (￿ = 0:00) are illustrated in Figure
2. The value functions of buyers and sellers (upper-left panel) illustrate the decreasing
marginal value of money in the amount of money holdings, implying that there are declining
incentives for self-insurance for wealthier agents. The remaining two panels illustrate the
agents￿decision rules. The upper-right panel illustrates m0 = h(m;e;￿;￿); while the lower
panel illustrates x = ￿ (m;e;￿;￿) and y = g (m;e;￿;￿). These panels indicate that an
agent receiving a buyer shock (e = b) uses her money balances to obtain more consumption
than what she wishes to produce herself. This results in fewer money balances to bring
into the following period. Likewise, an agent receiving a seller shock (e = s) produces more
consumption than she wishes to consume in order to increase her money holdings for self-
insurance. The decreasing incentive to self-insure is also illustrated by the sellers decision
rule for new money balances tending towards the 45 degree line. Once a seller becomes
wealthy enough, she will begin to mimic buyers and begin to deplete her money balances.17
The kinks in the buyer￿ s decision rules at low money holdings are worth elaborating on.
These kinks indicate that the agent chooses to spend all of her money balances and enter the
next period with zero. In the economy with ￿ = 0:00, this decision is shared by all buyers
who enter the period with money holdings of around 0.54 or less. These decisions have an
intuitive impact on the distribution of money holdings across agents, which is illustrated in
Figure 3. A large mass of agents (over 34 percent) enter the period with zero money holdings
and must therefore produce for their own consumption. The smaller masses of agents with
positive money holdings are those who share similar histories. In other words, these masses
of agents have received the same stream of shocks since entering a period with zero money
holdings.
Several steady-state statistics of the environment under various in￿ ation rates are re-
ported in Table 1. In general, higher in￿ ation results in a higher market price and monetary
17This occurs when a seller has roughly 14 times the average amount of money holdings.
15velocity, and a lower percentage of consumption goods purchased in the market. These three
results are highly connected, since the price level has a direct e⁄ect on calculating veloc-
ity, while decreasing the amount of consumption able to be purchased with a given money
balance due to the real-balance e⁄ect. The remaining three columns in the table report char-
acteristics of the monetary distribution which are not monotonic with respect to the in￿ ation
rate and depend on how much de￿ation is in the environment. In particular, for in￿ ation
rates of ￿2:0 percent or higher, the median of the monetary distribution is decreasing in the
in￿ ation rate while the standard deviation is increasing. This is again a direct e⁄ect of the
increasing price level. When prices are high, buyers are willing to spend more of their money
balances. In addition, high prices also increase the size of the monetary transfer between
buyers and sellers, meaning that some sellers are accumulating larger money balances and
increasing the standard deviation of the distribution. This increase in dispersion implies that
inequality is increasing in the in￿ ation rate within this region. This is also con￿rmed by the
increase in the Gini coe¢ cient as well as the Lorenz curves illustrated in Figure 4. When
in￿ ation and the price level are higher, the constraint binds for more buyers and therefore
a larger number of agents are willing to hold zero money balances. The sellers are accu-
mulating large amounts of money balances, which adds to the positive correlation between
inequality and in￿ ation in this environment.
One ￿nal observation to point out in the table is the change in the relationships between
the in￿ ation rate and the median and standard deviation of the monetary distribution when
the in￿ ation rate gets su¢ ciently negative. In particular, for in￿ ation rates of ￿3:0 per-
cent or lower, the median is increasing in the in￿ ation rate while the standard deviation
is decreasing. To get some intuition on this result, note that the Friedman Rule in this
environment is approximately ￿4:17 percent. At the Friedman Rule, money would become
an unattractive medium of exchange and the price level would be zero. At low enough price
levels, fewer buyers choose to deplete their money balances and the resulting monetary dis-
tribution becomes smoother than the one for zero in￿ ation. A smoother distribution with
16fewer or no mass points can exhibit both a smaller median and a larger standard deviation
(with a higher Gini) as reported in the table.
Welfare calculations for this analysis are done in a standard consumption-equivalent
manner. First, de￿ne the average expected welfare of an agent under in￿ ation rate ￿ as
W (￿) = ￿(b)W (b;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿(b))W (s;￿) where























2 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿(bjb) + ￿(sjs)
￿￿1 : The welfare cost in terms of consumption
of having in￿ ation rate ￿ relative to zero in￿ ation is given by (1 ￿ ￿0 (￿)) ￿ 100% where
￿0 (￿) solves W (￿) = ￿(b)W (b;0) + (1 ￿ ￿(b))W (s;0) with
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and ￿ de￿ned above. It should be noted that overall agent welfare is a⁄ected by a change in
the stationary distribution (￿0 versus ￿￿) as well as a change in the decision rules (e.g. x0 versus x￿):
This welfare measure can be decomposed by changing either the distribution or decision rules
one at a time. In particular, calculating the change in welfare when only changing the dis-
tribution (and leaving the decisions rules intact) will emphasize the change in welfare due to
the redistributive e⁄ect. Conversely, calculating the change in welfare when only changing
the decision rules (and leaving the distribution intact) will emphasize the change in wel-
fare which would be captured in a model with a degenerate stationary distribution such as
17a representative agent environment. The overall and decomposed welfare calculations are
reported in Table 2.
Generally speaking, agents ￿nd in￿ ation to be a welfare cost and de￿ ation to be a welfare
bene￿t. While this is a standard result, it is informative to point out several details. For
example, the welfare cost of 10 percent in￿ ation relative to zero in￿ ation is 5.10 percent of
consumption. This cost is much larger than previous calculations, and appears surprising
since a large majority of agents are said to bene￿t from in￿ ation by holding below average
money balances. The primary reasons for this result are: (i) high in￿ ation increases the
mass of agents at zero money holdings, making them worse o⁄ since they are no longer
self-insuring; and (ii) in￿ ation hurts buyers more than sellers, and the buyer-seller ratio is
2:25. To illustrate the latter point, the decision rules for consumption and production are
illustrated in Figure 5 for ￿ = 0:00 (the thick lines) and ￿ = 0:10 (the thin lines). The ￿gure
clearly indicates that higher in￿ ation induces buyers to both consume less and produce more
for all money holdings with the exception of a tiny neighborhood near zero. Agents who
were holding zero money balances at ￿ = 0:00 do receive a welfare gain when ￿ increases
to 0:10; but this population is dwarfed by the new agents holding zero money balances at
￿ = 0:10 who are worse o⁄. Although sellers are receiving welfare gains by consuming more
and producing less in response to higher in￿ ation, the high buyer-seller ratio places more
weight on the welfare costs of the buyers. The bottom line is that the real-balance e⁄ect
clearly overpowers the redistributive e⁄ect in this environment.
The contrasting decision rules in Figure 5 provide insight into the welfare results where
only the decision rules are allowed to change and the average utility is calculated under the
initial monetary distribution. This calculation would be closest to a model with a represen-
tative agent or a constant (degenerate) monetary distribution, and is larger in absolute value
for all in￿ ation rates. When the decision rules are kept constant and only the distribution
is allowed to change (third column), one can capture the sole impact of the distributional
e⁄ect. It is not surprising that the real-balance e⁄ect is depicting large welfare costs for high
18Table 1: Long-Run Comparison
￿(%) P median(m) Velocity std(m) Market % Gini
￿3:95 0:15 0:64 0:20 1:16 16:03 0:51
￿3:0 1:28 0:76 1:72 0:92 14:45 0:50
￿2:0 1:93 0:80 2:59 1:03 13:53 0:55
0:0 2:94 0:48 3:94 1:17 12:26 0:61
2:0 3:73 0:43 5:00 1:25 11:34 0:64
5:0 4:86 0:27 6:51 1:36 10:23 0:67
10:0 6:68 0:00 8:93 1:51 8:83 0:72
Table 2: Long-Run Welfare Results
￿(%) Overall (%) DRs only (%) Dist only (%)
￿3:95 ￿11:92 ￿13:43 5:80
￿3:0 ￿4:00 ￿5:14 1:56
￿2:0 ￿2:23 ￿2:84 0:75
0 ￿ ￿ ￿
2:0 1:50 1:81 ￿0:30
5:0 3:18 3:88 ￿0:55
10 5:10 6:36 ￿0:61
in￿ ation while the redistributive e⁄ect is depicting welfare gains. What is surprising are
the magnitudes. A 10 percent in￿ ation only delivers a distributional welfare bene￿t of 0.61
percent, which is dominated by a real-balance welfare cost of 6.36 percent. For all in￿ ation /
de￿ ation rates considered, the redistributive e⁄ect is less than half of the real-balance e⁄ect
in absolute value.
3.2.2. Short-run (transitional) analysis
While the previous section presents a welfare comparison among di⁄erent steady-state
levels of in￿ ation and zero, this section assesses the welfare implications as the economy tran-
sitions between these permanent levels of in￿ ation. This requires calculating the transition
dynamics for all prices, decision rules and distributions as the economy moves from an initial
steady state with ￿0 = 0:00 to a new steady state with ￿t 6= 0:00 8t ￿ 1: Transition paths
for the price level are illustrated in Figure 6. For comparability purposes only, the price
paths are normalized so the price level at the new steady state under the nonzero money












































x(m,b) y(m,b) x(m,s) y(m,s)

































Figure 2: Value Functions and Decision Rules, ￿ = 0:00
































Figure 3: Stationary Distribution of Money Holdings, ￿ = 0:00


























































Figure 4: Lorenze Curves of Monetary Distributions with Varying In￿ ation (￿):



























Figure 5: Decision Rules for ￿ = 0:00 (Thick Lines) and ￿ = 0:10 (Thin Lines).
23growth rate is equal to one. The ￿gure indicates that the economy converges to positive
in￿ ation steady states rather quickly because of the increased mass of agents running into
the nonnegativity constraint for future money holdings (m0 ￿ 0). In other words, higher
in￿ ation is inducing more agents to spend all of their current money balances and leave zero
for self-insurance. When the new in￿ ation rate is lower, there are fewer agents running into
this constraint which results in a slower transition.
The short-run welfare costs are calculated in a similar way as the long-run costs given
by (7) and (8), but with a few exceptions. First, the length of the transition needs to
be determined for each new money growth rate and is denoted by T: This time duration
needs to be su¢ ciently long enough such that the economy has reached the new stationary
distribution by the end. Second, the decision rules and distributions need to be calculated
at every period along the transition. These are denoted by x￿t, y￿t and ￿￿t; respectively.
Given T, it must be the case that x00, y00 and ￿00 are the decision rules and distribution
associated with zero in￿ ation at the initial time period (t = 0) and x￿T, y￿T and ￿￿T are the
steady state decision rules and stationary distribution associated with the new (permanent)
in￿ ation rate ￿: Along the transition from ￿0 = 0:00 to ￿T = ￿, de￿ne the average expected
























The welfare cost from transitioning to some in￿ ation rate ￿ (in terms of consumption)
relative to remaining at zero in￿ ation is given by
￿
1 ￿ ^ ￿0 (￿)
￿
￿ 100% where ^ ￿0 (￿) solves
































24Table 3: Short-Run Welfare Results








In other words, ^ ￿0 (￿) delivers the average welfare e⁄ects along the transition path relative
to how well o⁄ the agents would be if the economy remained at zero in￿ ation and never
experience a transition.18 These welfare implications are reported in Table 3 along with the
transition length T for each terminal in￿ ation rate ￿.
The table suggests that the welfare implications along the transition to a new in￿ ation
rate are similar to those reported for the long-run analysis. In particular, a transition
to a positive (negative) in￿ ation rate delivers overall welfare costs (gains). For example,
transitioning to a permanent in￿ ation rate of 10 percent compared to remaining at zero
percent in￿ ation costs 2:25 percent of consumption, and this transition takes only 5 (annual)
periods. This transitional cost, combined with the long-run cost reported in Table 1, suggest
that the total welfare costs of 10 percent in￿ ation can be as high as 7:35 percent. Although
the transition lengths di⁄er for the other in￿ ation rates considered, the short-run welfare
implications are of similar sign and generally half the size of the long-run results. One
exception is for the transition to ￿0:0395 percent, which delivers a very small welfare gain of
￿0:0668 percent. This result could possibly be due to the fact that the steady states under
this new in￿ ation rate and zero percent in￿ ation share distributions with very similar levels
of dispersion (Table 1 reports standard deviations of 1.16 and 1.17 for ￿ = ￿0:0395 and
￿ = 0:00; respectively). Otherwise, the bigger the increase (decrease) in dispersion observed
in the new steady state, the bigger the welfare cost (bene￿t) along the transition.
18The expressions above use a ￿ ^￿simply to di⁄erentiate these short-run welfare expressions from the
long-run expressions.








































Figure 6: Transition path of normalized price level from ￿0 = 0:00:
263.2.3. Politico-economic analysis
The analysis now turns to an individual welfare analysis and asks which in￿ ation rate
would appeal to a majority of the agents. This is accomplished under the assumptions of a
one-time vote for the agents and commitment on the part of the monetary authority. This
implies that the law of motion for the money growth rate is a one-time jump from the initial
value (￿) to the new permanent value (￿0) at t = 1; and the dynamics amount to solving the
transition of the economy in the same way as in the short run analysis.
As in previous analyses of a politico-economic equilibrium, preferences among voting
alternatives need to be single-peaked in order to establish that the median voter theorem
applies.19 Since a general proof of single-peakedness of the indirect utility function (5) is
unavailable for this environment, it is veri￿ed numerically for every (m;e;￿;￿) including
those o⁄-the-equilibrium path. An example of this veri￿cation is illustrated in Figure 7
which plots ~ V (m;e;￿;￿;￿0) over ￿0 for buyers and sellers holding money balances equal to
the quartiles of the stationary monetary distribution ￿ associated with ￿ = 0:00: In addition
to con￿rming the single-peakedness requirement, the ￿gure indicates that poorer agents (Q1)
prefer in￿ ation while richer agents (Q3) prefer de￿ ation.20
In order to reach a voting outcome, transitions from every ￿ to every ￿0 are used to cal-
culate the indirect utility function (5) for every agent, which are to determine each agent￿ s
most-preferred in￿ ation rate following (6). Finally, the prevailing in￿ ation rate is determined
by ￿nding the median in￿ ation rate of the resulting distribution of most-preferred in￿ ation
rates. A list of prevailing in￿ ation rates given various initial in￿ ation rates are reported in
Table 4. For all initial in￿ ation rates of ￿2:00 percent or higher, the prevailing in￿ ation
rates are lower due to the dominating real-balance e⁄ect. However, a steady-state PRCE
exists with ￿￿ = ￿0:03: In other words, this is the unique initial in￿ ation rate such that the
19In particular, one must establish that the voting outcome beats any other feasible alternative in pairwise
comparisons.
20It should be noted that although the choice for the agents with Q3 money holdings is not an interior
solution, it has been veri￿ed for all voting outcomes that the solution for the median lies in the interior.


























































Figure 7: Indirect Utility Functions for ￿0 = 0:00:
prevailing vote is to keep the in￿ ation rate unchanged. While this steady state voting out-
come is de￿ ation, it is not the Friedman rule (￿4:19) which is the overall welfare-maximizing
amount of de￿ ation from a planner￿ s perspective. This prevailing in￿ ation rate above the
Friedman Rule is a direct result of the redistributive e⁄ect of in￿ ation. Although this e⁄ect
might be small in the overall welfare analysis, it is large enough on an individual scale to
result in a voting outcome with a higher in￿ ation rate than the Friedman Rule.
28Table 4: Voting Outcome under Various Initial In￿ ation Levels









This paper set out to assess the long-run, short-run and politico-economic welfare costs
of in￿ ation in a model with essential money that delivers a nondegenerate distribution of
money holdings across agents in line with the data. The long-run analysis predicts welfare
costs that are qualitatively in line with previous ￿ndings, but their magnitudes are much
larger than previously reported. While these results are surprising given that the stationary
distribution indicates that there are a large proportion of agents who stand to bene￿t from
the wealth redistribution brought about by positive in￿ ation, the analysis shows that these
bene￿ts are signi￿cantly dominated by the costs associated with the real balance e⁄ect. The
short-run analysis predicts additional costs and bene￿ts which have previously not been
considered in models with nondegenerate monetary distributions. These transitional welfare
implications can considerably add to the overall costs / bene￿ts of alternative monetary
policies. The politico-economic analysis extends the model to determine which in￿ ation
rate would prevail if the agents of the model were allowed to vote. This analysis identi￿es
a signi￿cant dimension to the redistributive e⁄ect of in￿ ation, which is dominated in an
aggregate welfare analysis, by predicting a steady-state voting outcome that is higher than
the Friedman Rule.
While this analysis predicts large welfare costs of in￿ ationary monetary policies, the
model lacks features which may decrease these costs. One feature would be to have a second
asset (e.g. capital) that could serve as a useful store of value and shield agents￿wealth
29from in￿ ation. Another feature would be to allow the preference shocks to be persistent,
which would potentially induce buyers to desire more in￿ ation and bene￿t from the resulting
transfers. Unfortunately, the simple model studied here has di¢ culty matching the key
empirical moments (as well as additional calibrating moments) under persistent preference
shocks. Therefore, a more sophisticated environment is needed, with possibly more than two
types of agents or an additional asset, in order to provide enough ￿ exibility to match a larger
set of calibrating moments. An analysis of such an environment is left for future research.
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